Corporate Governance and Earnings Conservatism in Malaysia by Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi et al.
Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Conservatism in Malaysia 
Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether earnings conservatism increased after 
the amendment of corporate governance code in 2007 (MCCG 2007). Based on both 
asymmetric timeliness by Basu (1997) and accrual-based conservatism models by Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005), we find that MCCG 2007 enhances earnings conservatism. 
Our extended analyses of corporate governance variables contribute to the 
understanding of audit committee independence and audit committee expertise. 
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1. Research Motivations
Watts (2003a) argues that accounting conservatism facilitates the effective 
monitoring of managers as part of the governance system, and studies have examined 
the relationship between conservatism and boards of directors (Ahmed & Duellman, 
2007; Garcia-Lara et al., 2007; Garcia-Lara et al., 2009) financial accounting expertise 
(Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008), institutional ownership (Ramalingegowda & Yu, 
2012) and governance index (Lim, 2011). 
This study investigates the relationship between earnings conservatism and 
corporate governance in Malaysia between 2004 and 2009. A revision of the 2000 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) took place in 2007, and this time 
span allows us to investigate the incremental effect of the revision by examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings conservatism pre- and post-
2007. The revision of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2007 
marked a significant milestone in corporate governance reform in Malaysia as this code 
codified the principles and best practices of good governance and described optimal 
corporate governance structures and internal processes for the listed companies in 
Malaysia after the release of MCCG in 2000. The governance code is being reviewed 
to improve the quality of the board of listed firms by having in place the criteria for 
qualification of directors and strengthening the audit committee, as well as the internal 
audit function of the firms. The extensive qualifications of board of directors and audit 
committee in determining good corporate governance practices is expected to be 
translated into high financial reporting quality. 
We extend the examination on this relationship by including two sets of 
corporate governance variables highlighted by MCCG 2007. The first set, board 
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expertise mix, forms our second research objective and we predict a positive 
relationship with earnings conservatism. Our third research objective is to find a 
positive relationship between three audit committee characteristics: expertise, 
independence, and meetings and earnings conservatism.  
To ensure robustness of tests on earnings conservatism, we adopt both the 
market-based test, the timeliness of earnings to news (Basu, 1997) and accounting-
based approach, accrual-based loss recognition (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). Based on 
3,183 observations of Malaysia listed firms during the period 2004–2009, this study 
finds that earnings conservatism increased after MCCG 2007, supporting the 
proposition that corporate governance enhances financial reporting quality. We find no 
evidence that board expertise affected earnings conservatism post-2007. Further 
analysis reveals that among the variables that lead to the enhancement of conservatism 
for both market- and accounting-based measures are audit committee expertise and 
level of audit committee independence. The results also indicate that independence is 
an important characteristic in an audit committee, as there is a negative relationship 
between earnings conservatism and the percentage of non-executive directors, and 
positive relationship between earnings conservatism and the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors. The result suggests that, in the absence of audit committee 
independence, increasing the proportion of non-executive directors does not improve 
the quality of financial reporting. 
Our contributions to the existing literature are twofold. First, we extend the 
literature on earnings conservatism in Malaysia by providing evidence of how corporate 
governance has influenced conservatism since 2007 by examining the relationship 
between corporate governance and conservatism before and after the revamp Malaysian 
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Code on Corporate Governance in 2007 (MCCG 2007, henceforth). Second, we add to 
existing corporate governance studies in Malaysia such as Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) 
which examines the effect of governance reform on performance in 2001 and Lim et 





2. Empirical Predictions 
 
2.1.1 Corporate Governance and Earnings Conservatism1 
Since corporate governance is designed to mitigate agency costs between 
managers and owners/shareholders, conservative accounting can assist in mitigating 
agency costs in contracts (Garcia-Lara et al., 2009a).  
There are two views of the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings conservatism. The first, that corporate governance drives earnings 
conservatism, can be divided into two sub-arguments. Chi et al.(2009) offer two 
                                               
1When studying the association between corporate governance and earnings conservatism, we 
treat governance structures as exogenous. Our approach is the same as that of Core et al. (1999) where 
they observe that ‘Following most prior empirical research in this area, we treat the board and ownership 
structures as exogenous, when economic theory would argue that these variables are endogenous.’ This 
well-established approach of treating governance structures as exogenous is reasonable, in the sense that 
some institutional features of contracting cause governance characteristics to be ‘sticky.’ For example, 
directors serve for fixed terms, and it takes time to change board members to adjust to a changed 
operating environment. Like many prior studies, we argue that it is difficult for firms to have optimal 
governance structures at all times (e.g., see Larcker et al., 2007). 
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competing perspectives: the substitutive perspective that argues that conservatism is 
greater in situations with more agency problems and that a weak governance structure 
leads to more conservative accounting (a negative relationship); and the 
complementary, positive perspective that corporate governance assists in implementing 
accounting conservatism by helping managers and investors to distinguish between 
good and bad investment opportunities in a timely manner. 
The competing argument is that earnings conservatism may drive corporate 
governance (Garcia-Lara et al., 2009a). Bushman et al. (2004) find that when earnings 
timeliness is low, boards adopt stronger governance mechanisms as a substitute for 
high-quality accounting information.  
We argue in tandem with Chi et al. (2009) that stronger corporate governance 
will enhance conservatism. Conservatism can help managers and investors to identify 
and distinguish between good and bad investment opportunities, giving important 
information to investors and preventing managers from misappropriating their wealth. 
It can also help to reduce information asymmetry among investors by forcing firms to 
make timely disclosure of high-quality financial accounting information. Based on this 
argument, we hypothesise, in the alternative form:  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between earnings conservatism and the 
MCCG 2007 amendments 
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2.1.2 Board Expertise Mix and Earnings Conservatism 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that boards of directors are the central decision-
making authority in an organisation and that a board of directors may monitor 
management in a manner that increases their wealth at the expense of firm value. They 
also have a resource dependency function (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Resource dependency 
theory views directors as not as vigilant monitors, but as seeking to improve 
performance by extracting human capital resources from the environment (Pfeffer, 
1972).We apply the resource dependency theory by offering two separate variables on 
board expertise: ACC_EXPERT represents the percentage of a board of directors with 
accounting expertise, and FIN_EXPERT represents the percentage of a board of 
directors with financial expertise.  
This hypothesis examines the relationship between a board of directors’ 
accounting and financial expertise and earnings conservatism. Directors with 
accounting expertise have a better ability to differentiate between conservative and 
aggressive accounting policies; they have the ability to evaluate the nature and 
appropriateness of accounting choices made by managers; and as risk of litigation is 
heavily related accounting expertise, they have strong incentives to promote accounting 
conservatism.  
Based on resource dependency theory, Cohen et al. (2008) argue that non-
accounting expertise can significantly improve the effectiveness of an audit committee 
as they can assess business risks and determine whether an accounting adoption has 
economic substance. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) suggest that, based on resource dependency 
theory, the contribution of finance experts is the most effective non-accounting 
expertise, as they typically have a strong background in estimating earnings forecasts, 
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providing stock recommendations and carrying out due diligence in connection with 
equity offerings and mergers and acquisitions. Finance experts gather information not 
only from financial statements but also from a wide range of other resources (Dhaliwal 
et al., 2010). A mix of accounting (ACC_EXPERT) and finance expertise 
(FIN_EXPERT) should result in higher earnings quality, and hence better earnings 
conservatism. We posit the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
 
H2: The board mix of accounting and financial expertise is positively related to 
earnings conservatism 
 
2.1.3 Audit Committee Characteristics and Earnings Conservatism 
 
Our third hypothesis examines various audit committee characteristics and their 
effect on earnings conservatism. Audit committees generally function independently of 
the board of directors, with sufficient authority, resources and assigned responsibilities 
to assist the entire board in fulfilling its fiduciary duties (Rezaee, 2010). 
The three dominant characteristics of audit committees are their independence, 
the number of meetings they hold annually, and their financial expertise (Ghafran & 
O’Sullivan, 2013). We examine these characteristics for their effect on earnings 
conservatism. Audit committee independence is often considered an essential 
characteristic, influencing the committee’s effectiveness in overseeing the financial 
reporting process (Baxter & Cotter, 2009). While there may be independent directors 
on a board, the independence of an audit committee is more essential, as its composition 
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requires a majority of independent directors. We predict a positive relationship between 
the level of audit committee independence and earnings conservatism. We 
operationalise our audit committee independence into two variables: AC_IND, the 
percentage of an audit committee comprising independent non-executive directors; and 
AC_NED, the percentage comprising non-executive directors.  
The second characteristic of an audit committee is financial expertise, which is 
considered to ensure its effectiveness. Defond et al. (2005) argue that financial 
accounting expertise maybe more important than any other, as audit committee 
members are responsible for tasks that require a high degree of accounting 
sophistication. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) argue that accounting expertise in an audit 
committee is required if the committee to seek answers via accounting and auditing 
processes and to identify discrepancies in accounts prepared by the management.  
Sultana and Van der Zahn (2013) state that financial experts in audit committee 
have the greatest responsibility for financial reporting because of their superior 
knowledge and understanding of financial matters and reporting issues.  
MCCG 2007 requires that all members of audit committees should be 
financially literate and at least one should be a member of an accounting association. 
‘Financially literate’ means that ‘all its members should be able to read, analyse and 
interpret financial statements so that they will be able to effectively discharge their 
functions (Malaysia Securities Commission, 2007)’. As this interpretation is broad, we 
redefine it to mean that all members have a finance or accounting background, or both. 
This is because accounting is a subset of finance, and anyone with finance qualifications 
is expected to be able to read, analyse and interpret financial statements. We offer two 
variables for expertise in audit committee: AC_FIN_EXPERT, calculated as the 
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percentage of an audit committee that is financial literate; and AC_ASSOC, an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one of the audit committee members is a 
member of an accounting association body.  
Out third audit committee variable is frequency of meetings. As per MCCG 
2007, we operationalised our audit committee meetings variables into two variables: 
the frequency of audit committee meetings (ACMEET) and the frequency of audit 
committee meetings with external auditor (ACMEET_AUD). Xie et al. (2003) suggest 
that boards that meet more often are able to devote more time to earnings management 
or earnings-related issues. Xie et al. (2003) argue that boards that seldom meet risk 
becoming rubber stamps for management plans, failing in their monitoring duties. 
Vafeas (2005) suggests that the frequency of audit committee meetings reflects their 
effectiveness, as higher frequencies of meeting leads to them monitor better. Based on 
these arguments, we offer the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
 
H3: The independence, expertise and activities of an audit committee are 
positively related to earnings conservatism 
 
3. Data and Research Methods 
 
3.1.1 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Our sample consists of 3183 observations of Malaysian firms. Financial 
institutions, insurance and real estate companies are excluded because of differences in 
their regulatory frameworks. Delisted firms, firms with non-calendar years and firms 
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with missing data are also excluded. The sample is divided into two periods, pre-MCCG 
2007 (2004–2006) and post-MCCG 2007 (2007–2009). The year selection is centred 
on the effective date for implementing amendment MCCG 2007, 01 January 2007.  
Data for the Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) models were 
collected from Compustat Global. Data such as number of audit committees, number 
of board of directors, number of meetings and percentage of financial expertise were 
hand collected, lending uniqueness to our data. Following Vichitsarawong et al. (2009) 
and Ball et al. (2003), accounting variables are deflated by the beginning of period price 
to control for heterocedasticity. The 1st and 100th percentiles of each variable are 
winsorised to reduce the effect of outliers. 
 
3.1.2 Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings and accounting conservatism were tested 
using Basu (1997)’s model specification. This model has been tested in Malaysia by 
Ball et al. (2003) and Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) and is as follows: 
 
Nit = b0Interceptit + b1DRit + b2Rit + b3Rit * DRit + eit 
(Equation 1) 
where Nit is net income before extraordinary items per share of firm i, deflated 
by beginning of period share price; Rit is fiscal year continuously compounded return; 
and DRit  is dummy variable, taking the value of  one if Rit is negative, and zero 
otherwise.  
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In this model, stock return is the independent variable and earnings is the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on stock return b2 measures the sensitivity of 
accounting income to positive stock returns (a proxy for economic gains). The 
coefficient b3 is the main measurement for earnings conservatism, and measures the 
incremental sensitivity of accounting income to the incorporation of bad news as 
measured by negative stock returns (a proxy for economic losses). The total sensitivity 
of accounting income to negative stock returns is measured by (b2 + b3).  
In order to test the relationship between adoption of MCCG 2007 and earnings 
conservatism, Basu’s (1997) model is employed using a dummy year for the period pre- 
(year 2004 till 2006) and post- MCCG 2007 (2007 till 2009): 
 
Nit = b0Interceptit + b1DRit + b2Rit + b3Rit * DRit +b4MCCGit + b5MCCG*Rit + 
b6MCCG*DRit + b7MCCG*DR*Rit + eit 
(Equation 2) 
  
where all variables are as described above. MCCG takes the value of 1 for the 
period after MCCG 2007 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient b7 measures the relationship 
between the level of asymmetric timeliness of conservatism and MCCG 2007. It is 
expected that the coefficient will be positive and significant, showing that earnings 
conservatism increases after adoption of MCCG 2007.  
In order to test H2 and H3, each corporate governance variable is interacted with 
each of the variables in Basu’s model, as stated below. The equation is run separately 
for the period before and after MCCG to determine the effect of corporate governance 
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variables on earnings conservatism. This study uses panel data analysis to account for 
individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2008). 
 
Nit = b0 Interceptit + b1DRit + b2Rit + b3Rit * DRit+ b4ACC_EXPERTit + 
b5ACC_EXPERT* DRit + b6ACC_EXPERT* Rit + b7ACC_EXPERT* Rit 
*DRit+b8FIN_EXPERTit+b9FIN_EXPERT*DRit + b10FIN_EXPERT*Rit + 
b11FIN_EXPERT*Rit*DRit+  b12AC_FIN_EXPERTit + b13AC_FIN_EXPERT*DRit + 
b14AC_FIN_EXPERT* Rit + b15AC_FIN_EXPERT*Rit*DRit + b16AC_ASSOCit + 
b17AC_ASSOC*DRit + b18AC_ASSOC*Rit+ b19AC_ASSOC*Rit*DRit + b20AC_NEDit 
+ b21AC_NED*DRit +  b22AC_NED*Rit + b23AC_NED*Rit*DRit + b24AC_INDit + 
b25AC_IND*DRit + b26AC_IND* Rit +  b27AC_IND* Rit * DRit+  b28ACMEETit + 
b29ACMEET*DRit + b30ACMEET* Rit + b31ACMEET* Rit * DRit + 
b32ACMEET_AUDit    + b33ACMEET_AUD*DRit+b34ACMEET_AUD* Rit+   
b35ACMEET_AUD* Rit * DRit +     eit 
 
(Equation 3)  
The variables of interest are in bold as their coefficients 
(b7,b11,b15,b19,b23,b27,b31,and b35)reflect the level of earnings conservatism.  
3.1.3 Accrual-based loss recognition 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that the reverse regression approach assumes 
asymmetrical and efficient reaction to economic news. As an alternative measure for 
conservatism, we adopt accrual-based loss recognition, in which accruals are timely in 
reflecting cash flows. Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model uses operating cash flow to 
determine bad news and good news; they argue that accruals incorporate a conservative 
role where economic losses are more likely to be recognised on a timely basis as 
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unrealised accrued charges against income. In contrast, economic gains are more likely 
to be recognised when realised, and hence are accounted for on a cash basis (Ahmed & 
Henry, 2012).  The base model for Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model is as follows: 
 
ACCit = c0 Interceptit + c1DCFOit + c2CFOit + c3CFOit * DCFOit +eit 
(Equation 4) 
 
Where ACCit  is accruals (the difference between operating profit and cash flow 
from operations) scaled by the book value of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. DCFOit takes the value of 1 if the CFOit is negative, while CFOit is cash flow from 
operating activities scaled by the book value of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. Like equation 2 above, we have the following regression to test the incremental 
impact of MCCG:  
 
ACCit = c0Interceptit + c1DCFOit + c2CFOit + c3CFOit * DCFOit +c4MCCGit + 
c5MCCG*CFOit + c6MCCG*DCFOit + c7MCCG*DCFO*CFOit + eit 
(Equation 5) 
 
In order to test H2 and H3, we have the following accrual-based loss recognition 
model: 
Nit = c0 Interceptit + c1DCFOit + c2CFOit + c3CFOit * DCFOit + 
c4ACC_EXPERTit + c5ACC_EXPERT* DCFOit + c6ACC_EXPERT* CFOit + 
c7ACC_EXPERT* CFOit*DCFOit+ c8FIN_EXPERTit +c9FIN_EXPERT*DCFOit + 
c10FIN_EXPERT*CFOit+ c11FIN_EXPERT*CFOit*DCFOit+  
c12AC_FIN_EXPERTit + c13AC_FIN_EXPERT*DCFOit + c14AC_FIN_EXPERT* 
CFOit + c15AC_FIN_EXPERT*CFOit*DCFOit + c16AC_ASSOCit + 
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c17AC_ASSOC*DCFOit + c18AC_ASSOC*CFOit+ c19AC_ASSOC*CFOit*DCFOit + 
c20AC_NEDit + c21AC_NED*DCFOit +  c22AC_NED*CFOit + 
c23AC_NED*CFOit*DCFOit + c24AC_INDit + c25AC_IND*DCFOit + c26AC_IND* 
CFOit +  c27AC_IND* CFOit* DCFOit+  c28ACMEETit + c29ACMEET*DCFOit + 
c30ACMEET* CFOit + c31ACMEET* CFOit* DCFOit + c32ACMEET_AUDit    + 
c33ACMEET_AUD*DCFOit+  c34ACMEET_AUD* CFOit +   c35ACMEET_AUD * 




The variables of interest are in bold as their coefficients 
(c7,c11,c15,c19,c23,c27,c31,and c35) reflect the level of earnings conservatism based on 
accrual-based loss recognition.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Results  
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents differences in the mean and median values of our measures of 
corporate governance and institutional culture variables for the periods before and after 
the amendment of MCCG in 2007. The table shows a significant improvement in some 
of the corporate governance variables after 2007: ACC_EXPERT increases from 24 
percent to 26 percent, significant for both t-test and Mann-Whitney test. 
AC_FIN_EXPERT also increases from 38 percent to 40 percent, significant for both t-
test and Mann-Whitney. AC_IND and AC_NED increase almost 20 percent, from 71.62 
percent to 82.68 percent and from 79.08 percent to 93.17 percent respectively. The high 
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increment indicates the positive effect of MCCG 2007, but still falls short as MCGG 
2007 requires all members of the audit committee to be non-executive directors. 
ACMEET also improves significantly after MCCG 2007, and other variables such as 
FIN_EXPERT and AC_ASSOC show an improvement but the difference is not 
significant. The average ACMEET_AUD shows a significant increment, with a mean 
increase from 0.251 to 0.807. This result shows that most firms still do not comply with 
MCCG 2000, which requires firms to have at least one meeting with external auditors 
without the presence of executive board members. 
 




Table 3 presents both Pearson and Spearman-rank correlations for the test 
variables. Generally, there is no serious multicollinearity issue between the variables. 
The correlation coefficients are at around 0.3 or lower, except for the correlation 
coefficient between the corporate governance variables. For example, the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between ACC_EXPERT and AC_FIN_EXPERT is 0.606 and the 
Spearman correlation coefficient between AC_NED and AC_IND is 0.517.  
 




Table 4 reports the regression results of earnings conservatism and MCCG 
2007. The intercept is significantly positive (3.806, t=2.067, p<0.05), as predicted by 
Basu (1997), showing that earnings conservatism increased after MCCG 2007 and is 
significant at 5 percent level tabulated in column 2 of Table 4. We find similar results 
for accrual-based loss recognition, which depicts an increase in conservatism (0.272, 
t=1.778, p<0.10) presented in column 4 of Table 4.  
The result indicates both the positive effect of MCCG 2000 and the increased 
positive effect after the amendment MCCG 2007. This supports Abdul Wahab et al. 
(2007), who consider the establishment of the (MCCG) as one of the recommendations 
to solve the problem of transparency among firms in Malaysia. Consistent with previous 
studies (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007, Garcia-Lara et al., 2009a, Kousenidis et al., 2009, 
Jiang et al., 2008), the result supports that corporate governance provides greater 
monitoring of financial reporting and hence firms with strong corporate governance 
experience significantly improved quality of earnings conservatism.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
                                               
2 Consistent with extant literature on conservatism, a number of interaction terms are used in 
this study. These interaction terms could give rise to potential multicollinearity issues. In some cases, the 
variance inflation factors are found to be higher than the preferred threshold of 10.  
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4.1.4 Asymmetric timeliness of Earnings 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance 
and earnings conservatism for two separate samples: pre- and post-MCCG 2007. We 
do not find that the revised MCCG 2007 affects the relationship between board 
expertise (ACC_EXPERT and FIN_EXPERT) and conservatism. As we find a 
significant relationship between board expertise (ACC_EXPERT) and conservatism 
prior to the improvement of the code, this suggests that the revision has had minimal 
effect on earnings quality in Malaysia. We cannot support the proposition that board 
expertise mix (H2) improves earnings conservatism.  
This study finds a significant positive relationship between earnings 
conservatism and the percentage of audit committees that are financially literate 
(AC_FIN_EXPERT*DR*R) before and after MCCG 2007 (0.208, t=2.175, 
p<0.05),(column 3, Table 5); this supports the hypothesis that MCCG 2007 enhances 
earnings conservatism, and supports the view that audit committees that have financial 
expertise are less likely to engage in fraudulent financial reporting (Farber, 2005) and 
earnings restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal & Chadwa, 2005), and more likely 
to have forecast updates (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005).  
Further, we find that there is significant negative relationship between 
conservatism and being a member of an accounting association body 
(AC_ASSOC*DR*R) after MCCG 2007 (-11.342, t=-1.722, p<0.10), (column 3, Table 
5). We conclude that having an accounting qualification is more vital in enhancing 
earnings conservatism than having specific accounting experience or being a member 
of an accounting association or body. We therefore reject the view that effective audit 
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committee members are those who have experience, rather than those who have an 
accounting or financial background. 
Table 5 provides no evidence to support the contention that the proportion of 
non-executive directors on audit committee can enhance earnings conservatism; as the 
tables show, there is a significant negative relationship between earnings conservatism 
and AC_NED after MCCG 2007 (AC_NED*DR*R); the result was significant and 
positive before MCCG 2007. Nevertheless, the proportion of independent non-
executive audit committee members (AC_IND*DR*R) enhances earnings conservatism 
as the result is significantly positive (0.176, t=1.738, p<0.10) after MCCG 2007.  
Contrary to past studies which document that a higher frequency of audit 
meetings is associated with factors that enhance financial reporting quality (Kent et al., 
2010; Koh et al., 2007; Vafeas, 2005; Xie et al., 2003), we find a negative significant 
relationship between earnings conservatism (-3.128, t=-2.977, p<0.010) and the 
number of audit committee meetings (ACMEET*DR*R) (column 3, Table 5). There is 
a negative relationship between earnings conservatism and ACMEET that becomes 
even stronger after MCCG 2007, and is significant at 1 percent level.  
Result indicate that audit committee meetings are an indicator of the overall 
demand for monitoring a firm’s financial reporting (Engel et al., 2010; Goodwin-
Stewart & Kent, 2006),which is believed to translate into greater transparency. 
However, too many meetings in a year may lead to lower reporting quality if audit 
committees use the time to discuss issues unrelated to their monitoring task.  
Table 5 provides regression results for audit committee meetings measured by 
ACMEET_AUD (ACMEET_AUD*DR*R). The MCCG 2000 was amended in 2007 to 
increase the number of audit committee meetings, with an external auditor but without 
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the present of executive members, from one to two meetings per year. The objective of 
our test is not simply to determine the effect of audit committee meetings on earnings 
conservatism, but to test the independence of their audit committee now the code 
requires some meetings to be held without the presence of executive board members. 
Our result indicates that the interaction variable ACMEET_AUD*DR*R was 
insignificant even before MCCG 2007, and we therefore find no evidence to indicate 
that such meetings enhance financial reporting quality.  
  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.1.5 Accrual-based loss recognition 
 
Table 6 presents regression results based on the accrual-based loss recognition 
developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) modified to measure the incremental 
conservatism associated with corporate governance variables. We find a significant and 
positive relationship between AC_FIN_EXPERT and ACC after MCCG 2007 (0.031, 
t=5.047, p<0.01) (column 4, Table 6), and a negative and significant relationship 
between AC_ASSOC and ACC before and after MCCG 2007. We also find a positive 
and significant relationship between AC_MEET and ACC after the introduction of 
MCCG 2007. Our significant findings for accrual-based loss recognition are similar to 
those based on the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings model.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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5. Conclusion 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings conservatism in Malaysia. Our first objective was to investigate whether the 
change in corporate governance in 2007 through a revision of MCCG enhances 
conservatism. Our second objective was to examine whether board expertise, both 
finance and accounting, improves conservatism. Our third objective was to test whether 
audit committee characteristics affect conservatism.  
Based on 3,183 firm-year observations during 2004–2009, and utilising both 
accounting and market-based conservatism measures, we find that the revision of 
MCCG 2007 resulted in increased conservatism. We find no support that board 
expertise in accounting and finance resulted in increased conservatism. Only financial 
expertise and audit committee independence resulted in improved conservatism. Other 
audit committee characteristics resulted in decreased conservatism after 2007, 
including member association, the presence of non-executive directors on the 
committee (only for accounting-based conservatism) and the frequency of meetings.  
The result of the study highlight that the characteristic of audit committee is 
more vital in enhancing financial reporting quality. The importance of audit committee 
role has also been highlighted in an overall of Malaysia’s performance in Corporate 
Governance Watch 2010 which reported that the main weaknesses in Malaysia’s CG 
score is whether audit committees are truly independent and accountable in 
implementing their task. Our results suggest that the MCCG 2007 revision has affected 
earnings quality in Malaysia, and that the financial expertise and independence of the 
audit committee is essential in determining the level of conservatism in Malaysia. Our 
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study is not without any caveats. We do acknowledged the subject of endogeneity faced 
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Table 1: Operational Definition of Variables 
 
   
 Symbol Definition 
   
Panel A: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
 
Nit net income before extraordinary items per share of firm i, deflated by 
beginning of period share price 
 Rit fiscal year continuously compounded return 
 
DRit dummy variable that takes the value of one if return is negative, and zero 
otherwise 
Panel B: Accrual-based loss recognition 
ACCit accruals (the difference between operating profit and cash flow from 
operations) scaled by the book value of total assets at the beginning of 
fiscal year. 
 
CFOit cash flow from operating activities scaled by the book value of total assets 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 DCFOit takes the value of 1 if the CFOit is negative 
Panel C: Corporate Governance Variables 
 
ACC_EXPERTit calculated as percentage of board of directors that has accounting 
expertise 
 FIN_EXPERTit calculated as percentage of board of directors that has finance expertise 
 AC_FIN_EXPERTit calculated as percentage of audit committee that are financially literate 
 
AC_ASSOCit dummy variable; coded as ‘1’ if at least one of the audit committee being 
a member of  an accounting association and ‘0’ otherwise 
 
AC_INDit calculated as percentage of audit committee that are independent non-
executive directors  
 
AC_NEDit calculated as percentage of audit committee that are non-executive 
directors  
 ACMEETit calculated as number of meetings held by audit committee 
 
ACMEET_AUDit Calculated as how many times audit committees conducted meetings with 
external auditors 
   
28 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Pre MCCG (n=1384) Post MCCG (n=1799)   





         
Panel A - Earnings Conservatism   
Nit 4.247 0.000 11.050 4.502 0.000 12.416 0.646 0.728 
Rit 1.113 0.926 1.117 1.214 1.000 1.121 0.006 0.000 
R(log) -0.119 -0.077 0.637 -0.027 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.000 
DRit 0.568 1.000 0.496 0.464 0.000 0.499 (0.000)  
Panel B: Accrual-based loss recognition         
ACCit -0.014 -0.009 0.131 -0.007 -0.003 0.137 0.117  
DCFOit 0.197 0.000 0.398 0.220 0.000 0.414 (0.112)  
CFOit 0.062 0.055 0.098 0.050 0.045 0.084 0.000 0.000 
         
Panel B – Corporate Governance  Variables   
ACC_EXPERTit 23.615 20.000 13.284 26.387 25.000 14.104 0.000 0.000 
FIN_EXPERTit 1.924 0.000 5.487 1.955 0.000 5.467 0.885 0.850 
AC_FIN_EXPERTit 37.783 33.333 18.359 39.725 33.333 18.868 0.002 0.000 
AC_ASSOCit 0.934 1.000 0.248 0.934 1.000 0.248 (0.990)  
AC_NEDit 79.079 75.000 14.381 93.174 100.000 12.828 0.000 0.000 
AC_INDit 71.616 66.667 9.632 82.678 75.000 15.780 0.000 0.000 
ACMEETit 4.860 5.000 1.249 4.939 5.000 1.296 0.084 0.016 
ACMEET_AUDit 0.251 0.000 0.472 0.807 1.000 0.768 0.000 0.000 




Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
                
                
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
                
Nit 1  0.175^ -0.074^ 0.097^ 0.191^ -0.142^ -0.021 -0.025 -0.015 0.013 0.008 0.020 -0.006 0.000 
ACCit 2 0.250^  0.236^ -0.300^ 0.089^ -0.071^ -0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.050^ -0.047^ -0.015 -0.092^ 0.008 
DCFOit 3 -0.079^ 0.367^  -0.606 -0.050^ 0.050^ -0.023 0.007 -0.030# -0.041* -0.021 0.005 0.029 -0.046^ 
CFOit 4 0.126^ -0.452^ -0.702^  0.079^ -0.053^ 0.010 0.018 0.023 0.027 0.069^ -0.003 -0.041* 0.077^ 
Rit 5 0.141^ 0.079^ -0.059^ 0.083^  -0.730^ 0.024 -0.016 0.009 0.031# 0.052^ 0.037* -0.058^ 0.055^ 
DRit 6 -0.119^ -0.072^ 0.050^ -0.063^ -0.866^  -0.022 -0.018 -0.006 -0.021 -0.075^ -0.049^ 0.042* -0.079^ 
ACC_EXPERTit 7 -0.047^ -0.022 -0.013 0.004 0.014 -0.013  -0.071^ 0.604^ 0.232^ 0.151^ 0.058^ 0.044* 0.107^ 
FIN_EXPERTit 8 -0.028 0.002 0.011 0.009 -0.004 -0.018 -0.057^  0.098^ -0.114^ -0.013 -0.003 0.014 -0.009 
AC_FIN_EXPERTit 9 -0.038* -0.036* -0.018 0.029 -0.003 0.004 0.552^ 0.105^  0.276^ 0.061^ 0.051^ 0.032# 0.052^ 
AC_ASSOCit 10 0.029 0.022 -0.041 0.035* 0.029 -0.021 0.217^ -0.104^ 0.227^  0.039 0.034# 0.021 0.054^ 
AC_NEDit 11 -0.012 -0.051^ -0.023 0.066^ 0.062^ -0.075^ 0.163^ -0.002 0.075^ 0.043  0.544^ 0.106^ 0.382^ 
AC_INDit 12 0.021 -0.010 -0.001 0.008 0.035# -0.047^ 0.067^ -0.005 0.010 0.045 0.518^  0.051^ 0.309^ 
AC_MEETit 13 -0.018 -0.050^ 0.033# -0.064^ -0.039* 0.027 0.020 0.036 -0.011 0.012 0.092^ 0.068^  0.124^ 
ACMEET_AUDit 14 0.010 0.002 -0.045 0.076^ 0.065^ -0.076^ 0.105^ 0.004 0.055^ 0.050^ 0.385^ 0.284^ 0.116^  
                
 
Please refer Table 1 for variables description. Pearson (italicised) and Spearman Rank correlations are reported in the table.*, # and ^ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 





Table 4: Earnings Conservatism and Corporate Governance 
 Basu (1997)  Ball and Shivakumar (2005)  
 
Asymmetric Timeliness of 
Earnings  Accrual-based loss recognition  
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
 1  2  3  4  
Cit 4.139  3.449  0.007  0.000  
 8.974 *** 5.879 *** 1.887 * -0.077  
DRit -0.835  -0.443      
 -1.353  -0.549      
Rit 5.344  7.795      
 7.516 *** 7.897 ***     
DR*Rit -3.488  -6.533      
 -3.445 *** -4.978 ***     
DCFOit     0.029  0.029  
     4.624 *** 2.823 ** 
CFOit     -0.430  -0.361  
     -14.185 *** -6.313 *** 
DCFO*CFOit     -0.077  -0.267  
     -1.079  -2.069 ** 
MCCGit   0.431    0.010  
   0.553    1.451  
MCCG*DRit   0.288      
   0.254      
MCCG*Rit   -3.710      
   -2.738 **     
MCCG*DR*Rit   3.806      
   2.067 **     
MCCG*DCFOit       0.000  
       0.037  
MCCG*CFOit       -0.094  
       -1.452  
MCCG*CFO*DCFOit       0.272  
       1.778 * 
         
Adjusted R2 0.042  0.042  0.096  0.093  
F-statistic 18.757 *** 21.331 *** 43.642 *** 48.093 *** 
         
         
 
Please refer Table 1 for variables description. *, ** and ***denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent level respectively. 
 
Table 5: Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings 
 Pre MCCG (n=1384) Post MCCG (n=1799) 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
 1  2  3  4  
Interceptit -5.768  -4.406  15.640  15.605  
 -0.945  -0.723  2.614 *** 2.538 ** 
DRit 3.530  1.660  -8.575  -7.725  
 0.449  0.211  -1.107  -0.996  
Rit 35.299  33.197  -15.663  -16.014  
 3.696 *** 3.483 *** -1.692 * -1.731 * 
DR*Rit -36.599  -34.244  19.458  20.699  
 -2.776 *** -2.598 *** 1.539  1.634  
ACC_EXPERTit -0.109  -0.106  -0.028  -0.028  
 -1.764 * -1.717 * -0.536  -0.531  
ACC_EXPERT*DRit 0.040  0.037  -0.022  -0.021  
 0.455  0.429  -0.293  -0.268  
ACC_EXPERT*Rit 0.350  0.344  -0.109  -0.108  
 3.266 *** 3.216 *** -1.347  -1.344  
ACC_EXPERT*DR*Rit -0.474  -0.470  0.074  0.076  
 -3.286 *** -3.267 *** 0.620  0.643  
FIN_EXPERTit 0.000  -0.013  -0.151  -0.147  
 -0.003  -0.115  -1.362  -1.317  
FIN_EXPERT*DRit -0.016  -0.005  0.048  0.045  
 -0.093  -0.030  0.303  0.281  




FIN_EXPERT*Rit 0.000  0.022  -0.048  -0.059  
 -0.001  0.103  -0.260  -0.317  
FIN_EXPERT*DR*Rit -0.062  -0.087  -0.067  -0.056  
 -0.219  -0.311  -0.270  -0.227  
AC_FIN_EXPERTit 0.056  0.057  0.075  0.074  
 1.214  1.234  1.822 * 1.819 * 
AC_FIN_EXPERT*DRit -0.040  -0.041  -0.022  -0.022  
 -0.650  -0.654  -0.380  -0.370  
AC_FIN_EXPERT*Rit -0.192  -0.185  -0.127  -0.130  
 -2.142 ** -2.071 ** -1.803 * -1.850 * 
AC_FIN_EXPERT*DR*Rit 0.235  0.231  0.208  0.210  
 2.008 ** 1.981 ** 2.175 ** 2.204 ** 
AC_ASSOCit -0.886  -1.001  -0.403  -0.381  
 -0.303  -0.343  -0.158  -0.149  
AC_ASSOC*DRit 3.450  3.738  -1.065  -1.121  
 0.890  0.967  -0.300  -0.316  
AC_ASSOC*Rit 3.400  3.990  6.048  6.090  
 0.600  0.707  1.218  1.227  
AC_ASSOC*DR*Rit 3.059  2.739  -11.346  -11.347  
 0.453  0.407  -1.722 * -1.724 * 
AC_NEDit 0.062  0.052  -0.093  -0.093  
 1.242  1.049  -1.791 * -1.752 * 
AC_NED*DRit -0.024  -0.010  0.014  0.002  
 -0.350  -0.147  0.180  0.021  
AC_NED*Rit -0.260  -0.249  0.122  0.128  
 -2.953 *** -2.843 *** 1.373  1.440  
AC_NED*DR*Rit 0.266  0.261  -0.238  -0.251  
 2.367 *** 2.328 ** -1.894 * -1.992 ** 
AC_INDit 0.052  0.051  0.065  0.067  
 0.709  0.693  1.457  1.515  
AC_IND*DRit -0.054  -0.057  0.020  0.019  
 -0.548  -0.580  0.327  0.311  
AC_IND*Rit -0.159  -0.157  -0.058  -0.058  
 -1.352  -1.341  -0.791  -0.791  
AC_IND*DR*Rit 0.184  0.180  0.176  0.180  
 1.093  1.068  1.738 * 1.773 * 
ACMEETit 0.090  0.081  -1.744  -1.734  
 0.178  0.161  -3.475 *** -3.456 *** 
ACMEET*DRit -0.109  -0.053  1.724  1.729  
 -0.162  -0.079  2.589 *** 2.599 *** 
ACMEET*Rit 0.061  0.102  3.327  3.310  
 0.066  0.111  4.032 *** 4.011 *** 
ACMEET*DR*Rit -0.921  -0.970  -3.128  -3.139  





ACMEET_AUDit 0.515  0.636  0.537  0.616  
 0.394  0.489  0.673  0.755  
ACMEET_AUD*DRit -1.209  -1.559  -0.595  -0.722  
 -0.654  -0.845  -0.520  -0.628  
ACMEET_AUD*Rit 0.569  0.318  -1.061  -1.130  
 0.305  0.171  -0.768  -0.817  
ACMEET_AUD*DR*Rit -0.519  -0.431  2.167  2.288  
 -0.191  -0.159  1.125  1.188  
         
Period fixed Yes  No  Yes  No  
Industry Fixed Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R2 0.086  0.092  0.044  0.045  
F-statistic 3.899***  3.997***  2.824***  2.793***  
 





Table 6: Accrual-based loss recognition 
 Pre-MCCG :ACC 
(n-1384) 
 
Post-MCCG : ACC 
(n-1799) 
 
   
   
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
 1  2  3  4  
         
Cit -0.103  -0.102  -0.046  -0.019  
 -1.605  -1.583  -0.968  -0.403  
DCFOit 0.184  0.185  0.144  0.142  
 1.741 * 1.750 * 2.044 ** 2.019 ** 
CFOit 0.739  0.721  0.470  0.486  
 1.303  1.273  1.273  1.312  
DCFO*CFOit -0.264  -0.240  -0.862  -0.886  
 -0.219  -0.199  -1.284  -1.315  
ACC_EXPERTit -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
 -1.016  -0.999  -2.929 *** -2.846 *** 
ACC_EXPERT*DCFOit 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  
 0.877  0.874  1.961 * 1.857 * 
ACC_EXPERT*CFOit 0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012  
 1.707 * 1.693 * 3.896 *** 3.784 *** 
ACC_EXPERT*DCFO*CFOit 0.029  0.030  0.004  0.004  
 2.163 ** 2.236 ** 0.385  0.450  
FIN_EXPERTit 0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000  
 2.524 ** 2.534 ** -0.144  -0.174  
FIN_EXPERT*DCFOit -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  
 -1.780 * -1.791 * -1.114  -1.238  
FIN_EXPERT*CFOit -0.027  -0.027  0.000  0.001  
 -2.692 ** -2.707 ** 0.055  0.127  
FIN_EXPERT*DCFO*CFOit -0.043  -0.045  0.019  0.016  
 -1.321  -1.362  0.933  0.774  
         






         
AC_FIN_EXPERTit 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  
 1.112  1.104  2.289 ** 2.309 ** 
AC_FIN_EXPERT*DCFOit 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 -0.099  -0.095  0.168  0.135  
AC_FIN_EXPERT*CFOit -0.011  -0.011  -0.009  -0.009  
 -2.245 ** -2.275 ** -3.421 *** -3.451 *** 
AC_FIN_EXPERT*DCFO*CFOit -0.009  -0.009  0.031  0.031  
 -0.778  -0.778  5.194 *** 5.047 *** 
AC_ASSOCit 0.074  0.076  0.001  0.000  
 2.793 *** 2.842 *** 0.046  0.017  
AC_ASSOC*DCFOit -0.166  -0.170  -0.117  -0.119  
 -3.253 *** -3.330 *** -3.513 *** -3.562 *** 
AC_ASSOC*CFOit -0.560  -0.577  -0.189  -0.176  
 -2.132 ** -2.201 ** -1.167  -1.080  
AC_ASSOC*DCFO*CFOit -2.493  -2.494  -2.770  -2.805  
 -4.022 *** -4.026 *** -7.420 *** -7.493 *** 
AC_NEDit -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
 -1.170  -1.179  -0.263  -0.874  
AC_NED*DCFOit 0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000  
 3.171 *** 3.131 *** -0.305  -0.227  
AC_NED*CFOit 0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  
 0.415  0.484  0.746  0.739  
AC_NED*DCFO*CFOit 0.094  0.093  -0.007  -0.007  
 6.146 *** 6.104 *** -0.859  -0.877  
AC_INDit 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  
 0.879  0.860  2.551 ** 2.500 ** 
AC_IND*DCFOit -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  
 -1.726 * -1.666 * -3.689 *** -3.688 *** 
AC_IND*CFOit 0.001  0.002  -0.010  -0.011  
 0.213  0.227  -3.990 *** -4.200 *** 
AC_IND*DCFO*CFOit -0.068  -0.067  -0.006  -0.005  
 -3.512 *** -3.498 *** -0.852  -0.668  
         





         
ACMEETit 0.003  0.003  -0.002  -0.002  
 0.509  0.493  -0.523  -0.571  
ACMEET*DCFOit -0.014  -0.014  0.025  0.025  
 -1.617  -1.633  3.756 *** 3.785 *** 
ACMEET*CFOit -0.106  -0.104  -0.045  -0.041  
 -2.106 ** -2.075 ** -1.326  -1.208  
ACMEET*DCFO*CFOit -0.070  -0.074  0.562  0.558  
 -0.531  -0.562  11.146 *** 11.039 *** 
ACMEET_AUDit 0.018  0.018  0.001  -0.002  
 1.431  1.448  0.232  -0.285  
ACMEET_AUD*DCFOit 0.009  0.012  0.017  0.018  
 0.329  0.419  1.508  1.633  
ACMEET_AUD*CFOit -0.032  -0.036  0.111  0.118  
 -0.301  -0.335  2.103 ** 2.235 ** 
ACMEET_AUD*DCFO*CFOit 0.389  0.415  -0.018  -0.014  
 0.764  0.816  -0.175  -0.137  
         
         
Industry fixed Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Period fixed  Yes  No  Yes  No  
         
Adjusted R2 0.945  0.945  0.955  0.956  
         
 
Please refer Table 1 for variables description. . *, ** and ***denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
